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CSR economic implications have been studied from various points of view. However, we 
think literature so far has failed to address some issues we aim to study in this research. We 
focus on the effects of disclosure of sustainability information, which is meant to increase the 
firm’s level of transparency with stakeholders, reduce information asymmetry and signal the 
company’s social accountability. There are two issues this thesis strives to understand; the 
first one is the empirical effect of the initiation of voluntary CSR disclosure on a firm’s 
market value, as measured by the stock price. The second issue is the hypothesis that CSR 
information can be used as a tool to greenwash financial information. Our findings suggest 
that CSR disclosure per se is not sufficient to raise a firm’s stock price, and that companies do 





As implicações económicas da responsabilidade social das empresas foram estudadas de 
diversos pontos de vista. Contudo, consideramos que a literature não foi capaz abordar 
algunas questões que queremos analisar nesta investigação. Vamos concentrar-nos nos 
efeitos da divulgação de informações sobre a sustentabilidade, que destina-se a aumentar o 
nível de transparência com os stakeholders, a reduzir a assimetria da informação e a sinalizar 
a responsibilidade social da empresa. Nesta dissertação há duas questões que queremos 
analisar: a primeira è o efeito empírico do início da divulgação de informações sobre a CSR 
sobre o valor de mercado duma empresa, medido pelo preço das acções. A segunda questão 
trata sobre a teoria que a informações sobre a CSR podem ser utilizada para esconder as 
informações financeiras (greenwashing). As nossas conclusões sugerem que as informações 
sobre a sustentabilidade per se não são suficientes para aumentar o preço das acções, e que as 
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To Friday, because Lisbon with you 
was sun, smiles, music, and dance… Happiness. 
To Fede, because you made me feel alive again. 
When I hold your hand, my heart is at Peace.  
To my family. Wherever I will be, you will always be my Home. 
To Paolino, Rebi, Franci e Simone, 
I hope life will give you a lot of Joy, and thousands of these experiences.  
 




“ Por eso dale mueve, mueve las caderas  
vamos a gozar la vida y lo que la suerte llega  
por eso dale mueve, sacude los temores  
no te quejes tanto y no me llore  
y para que vengan tiempos mejores .. 
Que suenen suenen suenen los tambores  
que cuando suenen se curen el alma y los corazones  
que suenen suenen suenen los tambores  
ay que traigan alegría y se lleven los dolores ! ” 












Companies worldwide are increasingly adopting sustainable activities, and integrating them 
into their strategic processes and operations (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). Sustainability leaders 
are increasingly addressing social and environmental issues by aligning their interests with 
those of their stakeholders (Moratis, 2016). The amount of voluntary disclosure of 
nonfinancial information in the form of standalone CSR reports has been increasing in recent 
years, as well as their average length (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Simnett et al., 2009). Disclosure 
of nonfinancial information is targeted to a broader group of stakeholders than just the 
investors (e.g. consumers who care about social issues, Lev et al., 2010) and it is meant to 
increase the firm’s level of transparency with stakeholders, reduce information asymmetry 
and signal the company’s social accountability. 
Nowadays, customers, investors, institutions and society at large are showing increased 
awareness and concerns about the impact of the business world on the environment and 
society, resulting in strong pressures for companies to engage in corporate social 
responsibility. Scarcity of natural resources, ethical theories of firms’ social responsibility 
(Freeman, 1984), recent financial scandals (e.g. Enron in the US, Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena in Italy), and the recent rapid growth in socially responsible investment in the US 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2011) are together causes and effects of this trend.  
Many scholars have studied the factors that influence the choice to voluntarily publish 
sustainability information (for example, Meek et al. 1995), and the choice to have the reports 
assured (Simnett et al., 2009), a natural consequence of the rapid growth of sustainability 
reporting and agency costs. An important result of the extant literature is that companies in 
specific industries are more prone than others to disclose nonfinancial information (especially 
environment-related), reflecting greater sensitivity of those industries toward social 
accountability issues (Simnett et al., 2009; Meek et al., 1995). The industry effect may suggest 
that companies are influenced by their competitors’ choice in terms of sustainability 
reporting. This conclusion is consistent with the finding that, all else being equal, most 
consumers prefer firms with higher levels of CSR (Mohr et al., 2001). Moreover, companies 
reporting on sustainability have been found to be more likely to appear in sustainability 
rankings and to be ranked higher than non-reporters (Ernst & Young BC, 2013). Also, being 
high-ranked seems to be correlated with size, degree of ownership concentration, degree of 
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globalization and the GDP of the country which the firm is located in (Ferrell et al., 2017, 
forthcoming). 
I.1 A global reporting standard 
Nonfinancial disclosure, or socio-environmental accounting, has its origins in the 1970s, 
when financial information started not to be considered enough to represent the actual 
corporate value of big firms. Supporting this idea, research has found that large MNCs 
provide more information in their annual reports than regulation requires, a signal that 
complying with minimum requirements is not sufficient (for example, Meek et al., 1995; 
Simnett et al., 2009). 
Sustainability reporting has become a common practice in the 21
st
 century. However, for 
reporting to be as useful as possible, a standard which would allow quick and easy assessment 
and comparability was needed. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has recently emerged as 
the global standard for sustainability reporting. Several stakeholders on a global scale have 
been involved in the process of the GRI Guidelines definition (companies, NGOs, labor 
groups, society at large), and all industries have been represented. This aspect has been crucial 
to the success of the Guidelines, as companies are more likely to behave in socially 
responsible ways if regulation and enforcement are based on negotiation and consensus 
among all stakeholders (Campbell, 2007). Moreover, the GRI Guidelines have been designed 
to harmonize with other standards (e.g. OECD Guidelines, ISO 26000, etc.) (Ernst & Young 
BC, 2013). Companies following the GRI Principles are also strongly encouraged to submit 
their reports to external assurance, which partly explains the fast increase in recent years. 
The Global Reporting Initiative and the Integrated Initiative AIC are currently collaborating 
to develop a new global standard, which will take the form of an integrated report. The 
objective of the project is to link and merge CSR and financial information into one single 
document, and stop considering them as two separated aspects of doing business. This new 
way of reporting goes hand in hand with the shared value ethical theory (Porter and Kramer, 
2011), according to which companies should stop thinking of CSR as only a means to avoid 
cost and threats and should start integrating it into the company’s overall strategy. In other 
words, sustainable practices must be seen as an opportunity to create more value and share it 
with all the stakeholders. “…managers should change their strategic outlook regarding a 
firm’s environmental performance, from fixating on the deadweight costs of ex post 
regulatory compliance, to focusing on the ex ante opportunity costs represented by 
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environmental pollution.” (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004: 3). More and more companies worldwide 
are adopting integrated reporting standards. 
Regulation and the legal environment are not immune to the relationship between 
sustainability and business. Governments and stock exchanges are trying to keep the pace 
with the advancements of sustainability reporting; some of them around the world require or 
strongly encourage companies to provide sustainability reports or similar disclosures. In 
South Africa, for example, companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange must either 
produce an integrated report with both financial and sustainability information or explain its 
absence (Ernst & Young BC, 2013). Back in 2014, an important change in the European 
regulation occurred. The European parliament introduced the EU Directive 95/2014, which 
became effective on January 1
st
, 2017 for all EU member states. It forces all companies with 
more than 500 employees to include sustainability information in their financial reports, and it 
is an important governmental recognition of the increasing importance of CSR issues in the 
business environment. 
 
I.2 CSR - economic performance relationship 
So far, we have seen that sustainability reporting is an actual and wide phenomenon involving 
different actors and causing important changes to our economies. However, it is not yet clear 
whether there are any positive economic effects of engaging in CSR disclosure. The economic 
and financial benefits of sustainability reporting are wide and diverse, making the whole 
process more than worth its costs for many companies. In other words, for those companies, 
doing well and doing good are not mutually exclusive. Gathering data and engaging in 
reporting itself usually stimulates positive changes in a firm’s processes and activities, hence 
driving managers to re-think efficiency measures, reduce costs, create a stimulus for 
eliminating waste and unleash new ways of thinking and space for innovation (Hull and 
Rothenberg, 2008). Voluntary socially responsible behavior can also help firms reduce 
compliance costs by avoiding government regulation. Moreover, changes that increase 
environmental commitment and improve employee welfare can reduce litigation and pollution 
cleaning costs (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Finally, CSR-reporting firms are better suited to predict 
and manage risks emanating from sustainability-related dimensions of business (Ernst & 
Young BC, 2013). 
1 Costly signaling theory: voluntary disclosed information is considered honest only when difficult or costly to produce 
(either in financial terms or in terms of effort). 
There is quite an agreement on some other positive effects that CSR investments have on 
economic measures. Examples are increased product differentiation (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997), reduced risk exposure (e.g. better risk management) 
(Godfrey, 2005), and increased employee motivation, retention and recruitment (Edmans, 
2011). A negative relationship has been found between CSR disclosure and the cost of equity 
capital; firms with a high cost of equity capital in the previous year are significantly more 
likely than others to initiate standalone CSR disclosures. In other words, the cost of equity 
capital decreases for CSR-initiating firms with superior CSR performance (Dhaliwal et al., 
2011). It is very important to note that, when we examine the relation between CSR 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital, issues such as endogeneity and self-selection arise. In 
fact, two different effects may occur: on the one hand, companies increase their level of CSR 
disclosure to reduce past high levels of cost of equity capital. In this case, a positive relation 
between CSR disclosure and cost of capital is expected. On the other hand, if CSR disclosure 
has a negative effect on the subsequent cost of equity capital, then the correlation should be 
negative. Overall, the predominant effect depends on many variables. 
 
I.3 CSR and greenwashing 
Greenwashing is a concept often referred to when talking about CSR; it relates to the 
possibility of firms to influence the overall perception of the company and create noise in 
their financial information through nonfinancial information disclosure. To the best of our 
knowledge, most of the literature about the greenwashing effect of CSR information has 
focused on the customers’ point of view, meaning that we do not know much about this effect 
on shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ perceptions. 
CSR disclosure is by nature affected by a company’s effectiveness in communicating its 
efforts. To the extent that this is true, research on CSR should also include the study of traits 
of human behavior, communication skills and other psychological phenomena. For example, 
we highlight the role of reciprocity (reciprocal altruism), the halo effect and the implications 
of a costly signaling perspective
1 
(Moratis, 2016).  
Unfortunately for companies, skepticism has recently become more widespread among 
stakeholders. Therefore, attention of CSR managers has focused on how to minimize 
stakeholders’ skepticism and lack of trust (Du et al., 2010, Moratis, 2016). A positive past 
track of CSR commitment has a positive effect on skepticism, as well as the effectiveness of 
2 “the extent to which a company relies on its CSR activities to position itself, relative to the competition, in the minds of 
consumers” (Du et al., 2010). 
CSR campaigns. The latter depends on the message content, the channel, and company- and 
stakeholder-specific factors: corporate past reputation and CSR positioning
2
 (Du et al., 2010), 
perceived congruence between stakeholders’ and company’s values, stakeholders’ support to 
the CSR cause (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2011), and perceived sincerity of motives to engage in 
CSR communication. Sincerity in turn is affected by the benefit salience of the cause, the 
source through which consumers learn about CSR, and the ratio of CSR investments/CSR-
related advertising. For example, neutral sources are better than company-controlled sources 
because commitment will be perceived as sincerer (Vanhamme and Grobben, 2016). 
In summary, the CSR effect will be most powerful when skepticism is low and perceived 
sincerity is high, e.g. when the sensitivity of stakeholders to CSR actions is maximum. 
Consistent with this view, Lys et al. (2012) found that the positive association between CSR 
investments and economic returns is due to the signaling value of CSR, e.g. CSR 
expenditures signal information about future prospects of the firm. 
The implications for this research are diverse and profound; companies may use nonfinancial 
disclosure not because of intrinsic motives in engaging in CSR but to create noise and 
positively influence stakeholders’ perceptions of the overall economic rating of the company. 
We will try to empirically understand if this is the case in the business world. 
 
I.4 Research question 
As we have seen, the CSR economic implications have been studied from various points of 
view. However, we think literature so far has failed to address some issues we aim to study in 
this research.  
The problem this thesis strives to understand is the empirical effect of the initiation of 
voluntary CSR disclosure on a firm’s market value, as measured by the stock price. In the first 
chapter, we highlighted the relevance of the topic for the academic research and the business 
environment. Next, we will provide a detailed review of current literature. Drawing on past 
research findings, we propose ourselves to test two different hypotheses that we hope will add 
new knowledge to the research field of sustainability reporting. It will be followed by a 
description of the methodology we used to collect data and run the tests. After describing the 
findings and main results, the research will end with conclusions and limitations of this study. 
We hope it may be inspiring for further research opportunities.  
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II. Literature review 
 
This section will describe the main findings of past literature on CSR disclosure effect on 
stock price changes. While some strong theoretical models predicting the sign of this effect 
have been developed, we found a lack of empirical tests. Nonetheless, these models gave us 
the theoretical background to develop the hypotheses we are going to test in the next chapter. 
Finally, we will present some important limitations that, in our opinion, have affected 
literature so far. 
 
II.1 CSR demand and supply 
Next, we draw on prior research regarding CSR demand and supply to develop a conceptual 
framework that will help the understanding of companies’ CSR activities. McWilliams and 
Siegel (2001) introduced a theoretical framework to study the concept of CSR and its 
economic implications. Their model focuses on the forces that shape demand and supply of 
CSR, and determine the optimal level of investment at the firm and market level. 
Demand for CSR can be split into demand from consumers and demand from other 
stakeholders (investors, employees, community, etc.). Theoretically, different types of 
stakeholders ask for different types of nonfinancial information (Meek et al., 1995), and they 
have different expectations in terms of nonfinancial performance.  
Consumers 
When consumers perceive a product as embedded with socially responsible attributes, they 
increase their perception of the firm’s reliability, quality and reputation. Therefore, CSR can 
be used as a differentiation tool in the same way as R&D investment. Consistently, 
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) have found a positive correlation between CSR and R&D, 
which results in both CSR-related process and product innovations (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001). 
Other stakeholders 
Socially aware investors are willing to pay a premium for the securities of socially responsible 
firms (Richardson and Welker, 2001), thus a positive correlation between consumer income 
and demand for CSR attributes has been hypothesized (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). The 
pressure for additional information is especially strong in the global competitive market for 
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investment funds for MNCs (Meek et al., 1995). Consistently, Gray, Meek and Roberts 
(1993) report that MNCs participating in international capital markets disclose significantly 
more voluntary accounting information than domestic listed MNCs. Advertising can play an 
important role in raising the awareness of CSR-related investments by firms, hence raising the 
level of demand. With reference to other stakeholders, “…, a variety of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) have emerged in an effort to establish codes of conduct and monitor the 
behavior of corporations.” (Campbell, 2007: 957) and they have been increasing their 
influence over the business world.  
When it comes to supply of CSR, the general reason why companies decide to disclose 
nonfinancial information is that markets are flawed by information asymmetry and agency 
costs, and disclosure is a means to reduce them. 
The debate on to whom companies are accountable (only to shareholders, or to the whole 
society) and the incentives that drive managers to invest in corporate social responsibility 
activities dates back to the 1930s, and it touches on the basic role of companies in a capitalist 
society. The two main theories are the CSR good governance view, as opposed to the CSR 
agency view. The former posits that the likelihood to be socially responsible is higher for 
well-governed firms, and that CSR investments can be consistent both with shareholder 
wealth maximization as well as with social accountability. In well-governed firms, the high 
alignment between the interests of shareholders and those of managers creates more 
incentives for managers to engage in CSR. Proponents of the latter, building on Friedman’s 
theory (New York Times Magazine, 1970), argue that CSR investments are the consequence 
of agency problems within the firm, as they are not intended in the interests of shareholders. 
According to this second view, managers have an incentive to engage in CSR only to extract 
private benefits (Ferrell et al., 2017, forthcoming). Using five proxies for measuring agency 
problems, several instrumental variables to reduce endogeneity problems, and cross-
validating their results with multiple samples, Ferrell et al. (2017, forthcoming) find strong 
empirical evidence supporting the CSR good governance view. Furthermore, they find that 
CSR can even be used as a tool to reduce the negative effects of agency problems on firm 
value. 
However, part of the academic research tends to forget that CSR does not come without a 
cost, e.g. firms must devote a portion of their resources to engage in CSR activities. For 
example, embodying products with CSR attributes often requires additional resources, which 
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result in higher costs. In fact, scale and scope economies related to the supply of CSR 
activities have been hypothesized (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). The voluntary disclosure 
decision is affected by the (perceived and actual) costs associated (Meek et al., 1995), and by 
the potential opportunity to gain competitive advantage through differentiation (Ernst & 
Young, BC, 2013). Examples of such costs are information collection and processing costs, 
litigation costs and political costs (Meek et al., 1995). 
Among the reasons that drive firms to disclose more of their nonfinancial performance are 
increased transparency with stakeholders, improved risk management, stakeholder pressure, 
seek of competitive advantage, increased brand/reputation image, and company culture (Ernst 
& Young BC, 2013). Large companies are more likely to report than small companies (Meek 
et al. 1995; Ernst & Young BC, 2013). Moreover, voluntary nonfinancial information 
disclosure has been found to be a particularly European phenomenon (Meek et al., 1995). 
Usually, firms initiating to publish CSR reports will continue to disclose CSR information in 
the future, a concept often referred to as stickiness of CSR disclosure (Simnett et al., 2009; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Prior disclosures may become the lower bound for future CSR 
disclosures, as investors expectations will increase (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). 
 
II.2 CSR - stock price relationship 
Some forms of socially responsible behavior will increase the present value of a firm’s future 
cash flows, thus increasing the firm’s market value. However, not all socially responsible 
activities have a positive effect on the present value of a firm’s future cash flows. 
Nonetheless, they may have a positive indirect effect on the corporate market value. Current 
literature should focus on both types of investments when investigating the corporate social 
responsibility effect (Mackey et al., 2007). 
Mackey, Mackey and Barney (2007) study under what market conditions engaging in socially 
responsible activities has a positive effect on a firm’s market value. Under the assumption of 
semi-strong efficient capital markets (Fama, 1970), all publicly available information will 
affect the market price of the underlying assets. Specific to CSR, this assumption implies that 
whenever firms publicly disclose their CSR activities, investors will automatically include 
this information in their valuations and it will be reflected in market prices. Semi-strong 
efficiency suggests that whatever public information about the value of a firm’s assets is, on 
average, likely to be reflected in the price of those assets (Fama, 1998). Under this 
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assumption, the stock price equals its fundamental value, the discounted sum of expected 
future cash flows (by definition). Mackey, Mackey and Barney (2007) also recognize the 
importance of extending the model with the literature about emotional and cognitive factors 
that influence investors’ decisions in financial markets (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Orlitzky’s model (2013) does so suggesting that behavioral finance is a more appropriate 
framework for the study of equity markets. Under this hypothesis, investors decisions are 
based not only on the available public information on business activities, but also on other 
beliefs which are typically called investor sentiments (e.g. Shiller, 2003). Those beliefs about 
future cash flows and the investment risk are not justified by economic facts, instead they are 
dependent on (endogenous) social and psychological factors. 
The two models by Mackey, Mackey and Barney (2007) and Orlitzky (2013) differ with 
respect to the basic assumptions on financial markets, but they share important assumptions 
and results and we consider them as highly complementary. Both predict that under certain 
demand and supply conditions, CSR can raise a firm’s market value. More specifically, 
whenever demand for CSR investments is greater than supply, companies can increase their 
stock price by filling the gap, e.g. by engaging in socially responsible activities and making 
this information publicly available. 
 
Hypothesis 1.  
When firm 𝑖 starts to disclose sustainability information,  
its stock price, 𝑃𝑖, will increase. 
 
If we define 𝜃 as the proportion of socially responsible investors, and 𝜔 as the proportion of 
socially responsible firms, in equilibrium: 
 𝜔 = 𝜃  
The first implication of this result is that firms which earlier change their status from non-
socially responsible to socially responsible will be able to raise their stock price more than 
latecomers (e.g. there are first-mover advantages) (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Barnett, 




Moreover, if we define 𝑃𝑆𝑅 as the stock price of socially responsible firms, and 𝑃𝑃𝑀 as the 
stock price of non-socially responsible firms, in equilibrium: 
𝑃𝑆𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃𝑀  
This equation is crucial to understand the process and the kind of incentives firms face when 
the economy is out of equilibrium, and that make stock prices increase. If demand is greater 
than supply, the arbitrage condition allows companies who invest in socially responsible 
activities to increase their market value, as measured by the stock price, even when those 
investments have a negative effect on the present value of the firm’s cash flows. 
 
II.3 Extending the model  
Orlitzky (2013) explains the mental processes driving the investors to buy more of these 
stocks, highlighting the role of CSR. If the hypotheses of behavioral finance and irrational 
markets are true, CSR is only used as a tool to create financial noise. Technically, noise can 
be defined as all the information unconnected to a company’s economic prospects. Since the 
impact of CSR (disclosure and) performance is still blurry after more than 40 years of 
empirical research, we may consider it as financial noise. Research has not been able to draw 
definitive conclusions (Simnett et al., 2009; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
Since the effect on the economic performance is not clear, CSR information is difficult to 
interpret and therefore “most investors are unable to distinguish between true and […] false 
market signals of CSR” (Orlitzky, 2013: 243), e.g. they cannot base their investment 
decisions on clear causal logics. The problem is amplified by the information asymmetry 
intrinsically present in financial markets; managers have an incentive to send false signals 
about their strategic commitment to CSR. Moreover, the blurry boundaries of CSR activities 
and the weak legislative constraints make it even more manipulation-prone than other types of 
information. The voluntary base of much CSR information and the lack of sanctions and rules 
are other factors raising the incentive. In other words, CSR signals are weak, dirty and 
misleading as there is no clear differentiation between noise and valuable information. If the 
assumption of inefficient capital markets holds, stock prices are likely not to be economically 
justified. Whenever such increases are economically unjustified, they lead to excess market 
valuations, e.g. stock price bubbles. Moreover, many investors may interpret past price 
increases of socially responsible companies as causal evidence of the economic effect of CSR 
and predictive of future price increases, thus reinforcing the cycle. Orlitzky argues that, when 
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noise is present in an equity market, it will accumulate over time. “Market participants, like 
all human decision makers, tend to eschew rational utility calculations in favor of decision-
making shortcuts (Kahneman, 2003; Shiller, 2003) because, typically, it is costlier to acquire 
valid information about specific company characteristics than to rely on rules of thumb” 
(Orlitzky, 2013: 7). Therefore, investors have only little incentive to filter out noise from their 
financial investment decisions. Logically, if noise is present in equity markets, security prices 
no longer represent fundamental economic values, because they will reflect noise. 
 
Hypothesis 2. 
Sustainability reports are used as a tool 
to create noise in stock markets. 
 
As seen so far, a consistent and important stream of research suggests that - no matter the 
assumption on the efficiency of financial markets - stock prices of companies who make 
socially responsible investments will increase if demand is greater than supply. To our 
knowledge, there are not any studies testing the validity of these models. Yet, in the end, 
whether voluntary CSR disclosure raises a firm’s stock price is an empirical question. Most 
studies (e.g. Jeffers and DeGaetano, 2013) have focused on the empirical question of whether 
sustainable companies enjoy greater company value than non-sustainable companies. In this 
paper, we take a different perspective: we aim to study whether there is an increase in the 
company value after firms start to engage in sustainable activities. 
 
II.4 Past literature limitations 
As we have seen, the impact of corporate social performance on the firm’s financial 
performance has been studied with mixed results. Margolis and Walsh (2003) note that much 
of past research focused on the association between social and financial performance, failing 
to explain the causal link driving it. Empirical studies should always consider the key 
difference between association and causality, and be aware of reverse causality and 
endogeneity problems in the regression specification. The Granger causality methodology can 
disentangle causality from association, even if there is not statistical test that can definitively 
establish cause and effect, as noted by Lev, Petrovits and Radhakrishnan (2010). Literature 
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has also been enriched with meta-analysis of past studies, but the final results still remain 
inconclusive (see, for example, Orlitzky, 2001; Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Several 
researchers have found a positive correlation between CSR and economic performance. Some 
argue that the effect is mediated by a positive impact on future sales growth, which in turn is 
mediated by customer satisfaction (Lev et al., 2010). Saeidi et al. (2014) suggest that a direct 
effect is not a good test specification, and they consider competitive advantage, reputation and 
customer satisfaction as possible mediators. Other researchers did not find any relationship 
between social responsibility and profitability (Aupperle et al., 1985; McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001). The study by Jeffers and DeGaetano (2013) suggests that the relationship between 
sustainable and economic performance can vary widely depending on what kind of economic 
indicators are considered (e.g. ROA, ROE, EBITDA, Market capitalization, etc.). There might 
be some degree of correlation among them, however, comparisons between empirical studies 
should always consider the variables used. Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes (2004) 
provide an interesting contribution: they follow Ullmann (1985) approach, stating that 
strategy should be included as an independent variable in empirical research, as it jointly 
affects CSR and economic performance. Obviously, endogeneity significantly affects the 
statistical significance of estimated correlations. To correct for endogeneity, they use a system 
of simultaneous equations. As Lys, Naughton and Wang (2012) correctly point out, it might 
be the case that the anticipation of future financial performance leads firms to undertake CSR 
initiatives in the current period, rather than the other way around. As a consequence, 
managements’ private information about the future prospects of the firm is an omitted 
variable in most specifications of regression models in past literature. Lev, Petrovits and 
Radhakrishnan (2010) suggest that management quality might be another omitted variable 
that simultaneously affects both social and economic performance. 
As theory has improved, many of the shortcomings of past research have been corrected. 
Stronger theories have been proposed, as well as more and better controls for previously 
omitted variables. Yet, the question of whether CSR generally brings a positive financial 
return remains without a definitive answer. Overall, the effects of corporate social 
responsibility on corporate financial performance vary across firms and over time (Barnett, 
2007). We propose two different critics to past empirical studies, and at the same time two 
possible explanations of this uncertainty of results. 
First, the common approach of empirical research is to study the statistical difference in the 
economic performance between socially responsible firms and non-responsible firms. 
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Furthermore, most of these studies consider CSR at a certain point in time, not over time 
(Margolis and Walsh, 2003). This approach does not consider the effect of the initiation of 
CSR investments on the long-run economic performance at the firm-level. In fact, even if no 
difference is found between socially responsible and non-socially responsible firms, 
theoretically it is still possible that socially responsible firms improved their economic 
performance with respect to the past, when they were non-responsible.  
The second critique is slightly more articulated. We argue that it is not possible to define a 
universally valid rule for CSR effects, as returns to CSR are contingent, not universal 
(Ullmann, 1985). The overall impact will widely depend on the ability of the firm to manage 
CSR investments, an intangible asset. The uniqueness and complexity of CSR lies in its 
essence; CSR is intrinsically directed towards outside the company’s boundaries, and success 
of CSR policies necessarily depends on the interrelation with stakeholders, beyond the firm’s 
effort itself. Managers of CSR-successful firms should know the importance of involving 
stakeholders in their CSR strategy, thus increasing the overall value created (stakeholder 
management theory. Freeman, 1984). Therefore, we argue, the variability of past empirical 
studies is not surprising; firms differ a lot in terms of the managers’ ability to involve 
stakeholders and to integrate CSR activities into the company’s strategy. Furthermore, CSR is 
very context-dependent, thus increasing variability even more (Barnett, 2007; Campbell, 
2007). As we have seen before, in some industries the firms’ social accountability is much 
higher than in others. Also, different regulation policies and legal protection of investor rights 
can widely affect CSR policies (Ferrell et al., 2017, forthcoming). There are several other 
factors influencing corporates CSR investments; demography, for example. CSR activities 
aimed at reducing the environmental footprint are perceived very differently in US and in 
Thailand, or by baby boomers and millennials. Geography and the geo-political landscape are 
other examples. This argument explains why CSR return on investment might also vary over 
time within the same firm (the presence of a learning curve of CSR investments might be 
hypothesized). Consistent with our point of view, Barnett (2007) suggests that “…the actions 
of a firm and the responses by its stakeholders in regard to CSR are path dependent such that 
different firms obtain different results from CSR, depending on their unique histories” 
(Barnett, 2007: 803). Following the same argument, literature on institutional analysis in 
sociology and literature on comparative political economy in political science have 
contributed to the understanding of the conditions under which companies are more likely to 
act in socially responsible ways than not. In fact, the way corporations treat their stakeholders 
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strongly depends on the institutions within which they operate. Factors affecting companies’ 
behavior are: public and private regulation, law enforcement, the presence of 
nongovernmental and other independent organizations, and others. Furthermore, the level of 
competition may influence firms’ attitudes towards sustainability investments; for example, 
CSR commitment can be used a signal to create and sustain competitive advantage over 
competitors (Campbell, 2007). Overall, we argue, the nature of CSR itself and its strong 
context-dependency make it almost impossible to demonstrate a universal theory explaining 
the effect of CSR on economic performance. Instead, as Barnett (2007) points out, researchers 
should try to develop a theory that can explain heterogeneity. “CSR cannot financially please 
all of the corporations all of the time, but it can please some of the corporations some of the 









As previously anticipated in Chapter 2, we propose ourselves to run two different tests to 
advance knowledge in the field of CSR reporting. Partially consistent with McWilliams and 
Siegel (2001), among others, we define CSR as instances where the company engages in 
actions that appear to advance social causes, including committing to environmental and 
human rights protection, providing community support, and so forth. In practice and academic 
research, CSR is often used interchangeably with sustainability; we also follow this 
convention (Dhaliwal et al., 2001). 
Even if some voluntary nonfinancial information may be disclosed also in financial annual 
reports, this dissertation will follow the approach of Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang and Yang (2001), 
which only consider the information disclosed in standalone CSR reports. The main reason is 
that these forms of disclosure differ in terms of depth and breadth of CSR coverage, and 
standalone reports may also reflect a stronger commitment of the company to its CSR 
activities and to improve transparency. Moreover, standalone CSR reports are on average 
more comprehensive and more detailed than CSR information included in financial annual 
reports. Furthermore, a voluntary disclosure of CSR activities shows a firm’s confidence in its 
CSR performance; when strong, it allows to send a positive signal, when poor, it allows for 
explanations (Dhaliwal et al. 2011). In addition to standalone CSR reports, we will include 
the so-called integrated financial reports (cfr. Chapter 2), the frontier of sustainability 
reporting that many MNEs have already started to adopt. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Assumption 1: in the last decades, there has been an excess demand over supply for CSR 
investments. 
 𝜃 > 𝜔  
Where 𝜃 is the proportion of socially responsible investors in society, and 𝜔 is the proportion 
of socially responsible firms in society. 
Even if it is difficult to test the validity of this assumption, we find it reasonable to assume an 
excess demand over supply for CSR investments. Increased public awareness as well as 
social, economic, and governmental forces are driving companies to adopt important changes 
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in their objectives and include CSR activities in their strategies. All in all, companies feel 
strong and urgent pressures to increase their CSR activities (e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; 
Jeffers and DeGaetano, 2013). 
Assumption 2: a portion of investors takes firms’ socially responsible activities into account 
when they make investment decisions. 
0 <  𝜃, (1 − 𝜃) < 1 
where 𝜃 is the proportion of investors who is responsive to socially responsible investments 
and who take nonfinancial information into account when they make their investments 
decisions, e.g. socially responsible investors, and (1 − 𝜃) is the proportion of non-socially 
responsible investors in the society, e.g. investors who make only economic and financial 
considerations in their decision-making process. 
Most studies on CSR focus on the effects of CSR performance; in this study, we take a 
slightly different approach. “The business returns are contingent on stakeholders’ awareness 
of a company’s CSR activities. Much of the academic research to date … has largely 
presumed or mandated … CSR awareness on the part of the relevant test populations.” (Du et 
al., 2010: 3). The level of CSR performance, we argue, is not per se sufficient to explain 
changes in price due to CSR activities; to do so, CSR commitment must be effectively 
communicated to stakeholders. The strategic importance of CSR lies in its power to change 
stakeholders’ perceptions, therefore, it is crucial for companies to be able to communicate 
their sustainability performance in the most effective way. This is the main reason why we 
decided to focus on CSR reporting, rather than just the quality and the level of CSR 
performance themselves. Disclosure and reporting are directly linked to investors’ beliefs, 
while performance itself is not. The first implication of our choice is that poor-performing 
companies in terms of CSR could, hypothetically, be able to reap higher gains than high-
performing ones, if they are better communicators. Even if this might seem a market 
distortion, we think it is a good representation of reality. A second natural consequence of our 
approach is that companies adopting CSR behaviors without engaging in any kind of 
reporting, will not be included in this research. 
Since our aim is to study whether CSR disclosure increases or undermines shareholder 
wealth, e.g. whether CSR reporting is beneficial for corporate value, market definitions of 
firm performance seem more appropriate than accounting definitions (Margolis and Walsh, 
2001; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). Therefore, we are going to measure the value created (or 
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destroyed) by socially responsible disclosure using the stock prices of firms listed on stock 
exchanges. Stock prices define a firm’s market value, when multiplied by the number of its 
shares outstanding. Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield (1985) argue that stock prices are unable to 
reflect on a firms’ profitability. Since we are not focusing our conclusions on profitability, 
rather on corporate market value, this critique will have no influence on our results. 
In particular, we aim to understand the consequences of starting to publish social and 
environmental information versus not publishing. We will assume that the first sustainability 
report published by company 𝑖 in year 𝑡 coincides with the start of CSR activities of company 
𝑖. We are aware that by doing so we are excluding firms who adopt socially responsible 
behavior with no intention to make it public, but they fall out of scope of this study. Also, 
they are the minority of cases. To conclude, let us remember that our aim is to understand the 
effect of the start of CSR disclosure, thus stressing this assumption would not change the 
results. 
For Hypothesis 1, we conducted a paired sample t-test, to test whether a difference existed 
between the situation prior and after the first disclosure. 
 














= 0 , ∀ 𝑖 
or 
𝐻0 ∶  𝛾𝑡 −  𝛾𝑡−1 = 0 
𝑣𝑠 
𝐻1 ∶  𝛾𝑡 −  𝛾𝑡−1 > 0 
where 
‐ 𝑃𝑖
𝐸 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑  
‐ 𝑃𝑖
𝐵 ∶ 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 







∶ % 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
If 𝐻0 is rejected, 𝐻1 accepted, then Hypothesis 1 will be verified; starting to publish CSR 
information increases a firm’s stock price.  
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For our purpose, period 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 will always be the starting year of CSR reporting, whilst 
period 𝑡 − 1 will be the previous year. For example, Deutsche Bank published its first CSR 
report in 2002, then 𝑡 = 2002, and 𝑡 − 1 = 2001. 
To refine our test, for each year we will take into consideration the time lapse ranging from 
𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙, 1𝑠𝑡 to 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦, 1𝑠𝑡, because all the company considered publish their financial and CSR 
reports within these two dates. As Lys, Naughton & Wang (2012) point out, disclosure should 
manifest its effect during a relatively short window surrounding the period in which the 
market learns of the signal. A further refinement of this type of test would be to study the 
difference in change of stock price taking into consideration the exact publishing date, when 
available. Stock market data have been downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Eikon 
(Datastream) database. 
In other words, we would like to understand whether adding CSR reports to the information 
publicly available to investors has a positive or negative impact on stock prices movements, 
compared to the years in which CSR information was not available. We aware of the 
shortcomings of the way the test was conducted; we will not be able to separate completely 
the portion of change due to CSR information from the portion of change due to financial 
information and the one due to other expectations.  
In formulas, 
𝛾𝑡 −  𝛾𝑡−1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 +  
where 
𝛼 = 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑆𝑅 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝛽 = 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
= 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
Whereas separating  from the other two might be very difficult, we see the separation 
between 𝛼 and 𝛽 as a natural consequence of our research. It will probably be not possible 
using real stock markets data, but such an experiment could be conducted in a laboratory 
environment by presenting different types of information to different samples of investors. 
Finally, let us say we conducted our research on firms listed in major European stock 
exchanges. We decided to focus on those firms included in the following stock indexes: FTSE 
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MIB (Milan, Borsa Italiana), IBEX 35 (Madrid, Bolsa de Madrid), DAX 30 (Frankfurt, 
Deutsche Boerse AG) and PSI 20 (Lisbon, Euronexxt Lisbon).  
Hypothesis 2 
To test Hypothesis 2, we first had to build a measure to capture: 
- the level of easiness (difficultness) to find information about company 𝑖 
- the level of clarity of information for company 𝑖 
We did this both for CSR and financial information. Since the values for CSR and financial 
measures had to be comparable to be informative, we tried to keep them as similar as possible 
by using objective indicators. Further refinements might include more subjective measures 
and reports content analysis.  
For each company, CSR transparency index and a FIN transparency index were built, using 
the following data: 
Reports 
Company reports for financial years 2015, 2014 and 2013 were included. For each of them, 
we considered the number of pages, the number of words per page, whether or not contacts of 
the responsible office were indicated, whether or not it had been assured by one of the ‘big 4’ 
auditing companies (Lys et al., 2012). Each of the components of the index weighted equally.  
Websites 
Company websites as of 20/02/2017 were included. For each of them, we considered the 
number of clicks to get to the download link of the report, whether or not there was a link to 
sustainability/financial information in the top link bar, which one of the two links to the CSR 
or financial reports appeared first browsing in the page. Each of the components of the index 
weighted equally. CSR_index values were obtained as the sum of two subindexes: 
CSR_index_R, the portion of CSR transparency index due to information disclosed in 
sustainability reports; and CSR_index_W, the portion of CSR transparency index due to 
sustainability information disclosed in the website. FIN_index values were obtained as the 
sum of two subindexes: FIN_index_R, the portion of financial transparency index due to 
information disclosed in financial reports; and FIN_index_W, the portion of financial 
transparency index due to financial information disclosed in the website. 
Only companies included in the FTSE MIB index (Milan, Borsa Italiana) were considered.  
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For H2, we conducted a one sample t-test, to test whether a difference existed between CSR 
and FIN transparency index. 
 
𝐻0 ∶  𝛿𝑖
𝐶𝑆𝑅 − 𝛿𝑖
𝐹𝐼𝑁 = 0 
𝑣𝑠 
𝐻1 ∶  𝛿𝑖
𝐶𝑆𝑅 − 𝛿𝑖
𝐹𝐼𝑁 < 0 
where 
‐ 𝛿𝑖
𝐶𝑆𝑅 ∶  𝐶𝑆𝑅 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖 
‐ 𝛿𝑖
𝐹𝐼𝑁 ∶  𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖 
 
If 𝐻0 is rejected, 𝐻1 accepted, then Hypothesis 2 will not be verified; CSR information is not 




Stock index N. oss Variable Label N Mean Std dev Min Max
DAX 20 MV MV 20 32,557.34        28,566.03        8,633.34       110,941.30        
NOSH NOSH 20 643,695.55      549,121.84      129,242.00  2,201,098.00     
VO VO 20 138.44             368.79             3.30              1,664.90             
FTSE MIB 22 MV MV 22 13,393.90        13,473.89        2,124.49       48,334.64          
NOSH NOSH 22 2,740,627.23  4,270,587.69  165,349.00  15,859,790.00   
VO VO 22 88,454.13        199,063.44      2,979.40       912,700.60        
IBEX 35 19 MV MV 19 18,138.49        21,272.25        60.89            86,167.00          
NOSH NOSH 19 2,505,574.16  3,619,453.35  55,896.00    14,582,340.00   
VO VO 19 58,825.00        121,229.97      865.10          516,972.90        
PSI 20 5 MV MV 5 2,548.57          2,144.91          340.80          6,071.26             
NOSH NOSH 5 749,361.60      788,396.86      24,000.00    2,000,000.00     
VO VO 5 5,651.68          9,484.44          33.90            22,366.10          
IV. Results 
In Table 1 and Table 2 we report the number of firms in our sample by stock index and 
describe them with respect to 3 variables: market value (MV), number of shares outstanding 
(NOSH), turnover by volume (VO). 
 
Hypothesis 1 
117 observations, corresponding to 117 companies, were available. Among them, we 
excluded 34 firms which never published any CSR reports to date. Among the remaining 
observations, stock prices were not available for further 14 companies; they were excluded as 
well. We started our analysis with 69 observations. 4 observations were flagged as outliers 
(Exhibit 4 – Table 1); we decided to take 3 of them out of our sample because they 
significantly affected the final results. 
Our definitive sample was composed by 66 observations (companies), characterized as 
follows. DAX, FTSE MIB and IBEX 35 were almost equally represented in the sample (Table 
1). Companies listed in the DAX (Deutsche Boerse AG) index were the biggest with respect 
to market value, but they also had the highest variability (mean=32,557.34, std 
dev=28,566.03). Companies listed in the PSI 20 (Euronexxt Lisbon) were by far the least 
represented of the sample (only 5 observations), and they were also the smallest in terms of 
market value (mean=2,548.57) and turnover by volume (mean=5,651.68). FTSE MIB (Borsa 
Italiana) and IBEX 35 (Bolsa de Madrid) companies were similar with respect to number of 
outstanding shares (mean=2,740,627.23 and 2,505,574.16, respectively), both with a very 
high std dev (std dev=4,270,587.69 and 3,619,453.35, respectively). With respect to turnover 










Con intervallo di confidenza superiore al 99% per la media






















-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Differenza
N Mean Std dev Std error Min Max
66 -0.0278 0.1519 0.0187 -0.3640 0.3969
Mean Std dev
-0.0278 -0.0724 Inft 0.1519 0.1237 0.1952
 CL Mean at 99% CL Std dev at 99%
DF t value Pr > t
65 -1.49 0.9291
The difference between prior and after the first disclosure resulted in a mean of the 66 
observations of -0.0278. The sample standard deviation was 0.1519 with confidence interval 
at 99%. As shown by the graph, the variable difference approximately follows a normal 
distribution, and the value of  𝐻0 falls into the confidence interval. In fact, the p value of the 
test is quite high: 0.9291, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis 𝐻0, e.g. % change year t = 
% change year t-1. In other words, our findings indicate that starting to publish CSR reports 
does not affect stock price changes: Hypothesis 1 is not verified.  
 
Paired t-test for H0: price change difference between year t and year t-1 = 0 
TTEST procedure 





















Stock index N. oss Variable Label N Mean Std dev Min Max
FTSE MIB 25 MV MV 25 14,460.84            14,474.13            2,124.49           48,334.64              
NOSH NOSH 25 2,880,603.24      4,309,994.46      165,349.00      15,859,790.00      
VO VO 25 89,132.33            187,574.55         2,979.40           912,700.60            
Variable Label N Mean Std dev Min Max
CSR_index CSR index 70 9.4640   15.1740 22.9456- 36.3745 
FIN_index FIN index 70 20.3359 12.8079 4.5126-   49.4389 
Hypothesis 2 
120 observations composed our initial sample, corresponding to 40 companies, 3 years each. 
Among them, we excluded 47 observations because their CSR index equaled 0, meaning 
either that the companies did not publish any sustainability report, or that the report was not 
available for that year. Among the remaining observations, for one of them we could not find 
the financial report, hence it was excluded from the sample.  
We started the analysis with 72 observations. 3 observations were flagged as outliers (Exhibit 
4 – Table 2); we decided to take 2 of them out of our sample because they significantly 
affected the final results. Our definitive sample was composed by 70 observations, 
characterized as follows. 
Consistently with the descriptive statistics for Hypothesis 1, the values for market value, 
number of shares outstanding and volume overhead are coherent with the FTSE MIB values 
(Table 2). CSR index values (Table 3) are significantly lower than the corresponding FIN 
index values in the sample (mean CSR=9.4640, mean FIN=20.3359) but with a higher 
variability (std dev CSR=15.1740, std dev FIN=12.8079), but we will test whether this 








The one sample t-test for the difference between CSR and FIN index resulted in a mean of the 
70 observations of -10.8719. The sample standard deviation was 16.7647 with confidence 
interval at 99%. As shown by the graph, the variable difference approximately follows a 



























-60 -40 -20 0 20 40
difference
DF t value Pr < t
69 -5.43 <.0001
Mean Std dev
-10.8719 -Infto -6.0997 16.7646 13.7217 21.3627
 CL Mean at 99% CL Std dev at 99%
N Mean Std dev Std err Min Max
70 10.8719- 16.7646 2.0038    45.2919- 27.3384 
p value of the test is lower than 0.0001, so we reject the null hypothesis 𝐻0 and we accept the 
alternative hypothesis 𝐻1, e.g. CSR index value < FIN index value. In other words, our 
findings indicate that CSR information is not used to create noise in stock markets: 
Hypothesis 2 is not verified. 
 
One sample t-test for H0: transparency index difference between CSR and FIN = 0 
TTEST procedure 





















V. Conclusions and limitations 
 
A stream of past research suggests firms to invest in CSR activities that are most visible to 
customers and other stakeholders to increase their economic benefits (Moratis, 2016). When it 
comes to stock exchanges, our findings suggest that CSR disclosure per se is not sufficient to 
raise a firm’s stock price. More specifically, we have found that starting to publish CSR 
reports does not statistically affect the difference in change in stock price from year 𝑡 and year 
𝑡 − 1. There may be multiple interpretations: first, investors do not take into account CSR 
information when they make choices about which firms to invest in. Second, investors 
consider CSR information but it does not affect their decisions in a significant way. Third, the 
portion of change due to CSR disclosure on stock prices is statistically compensated by the 
portion of change due to financial information, thus the final effect is statistically equal to 
zero. Our findings seem to suggest to investors not to consider the level of CSR disclosure in 
their decision-making process. However, this study was limited to the effect of the first CSR 
disclosure; it may be the case that repetitive disclosure throughout several years is beneficial 
for stock prices. Also, when it comes to the decision in which companies to invest in, 
potential (or actual) investors may be interested in the relative CSR performance and 
disclosure with respect to direct competitors, or to the other firms included in the stock index. 
As regards the second hypothesis tested in this study, we have found that companies do not 
intentionally use the CSR information they publish as a tool for greenwashing financial 
information. More specifically, the transparency level of financial information disclosed 
through annual reports and the online website is higher than the transparency level of 
sustainability information disclosed through the same channels. Hence, CSR information is 
not used to create noise. This result may be very specific to the countries we decided to focus 
on; we think it may not be valid in different economic and social situations, e.g. developing 
countries, due to the different incentives and challenges firms face in those regions of the 
world. Moreover, we believe that the innovative way we used to measure greenwashing opens 
various venues for future research.  
Finally, we gave possible explanations for the inconclusiveness of past results on the CSR 
effect on economic performance and proposed refinements for future research in this field.  




As previously anticipated, the main limitation of our test design of Hypothesis 1 is that we 
were not able to separate completely the CSR effect from the financial effect. The difficulty 
of testing the validity of the theoretical models presented in Chapter 2 lies in the mixed effect 
of real stock prices movements due to different factors. One way to conduce a more robust 
test would be to simulate a stock market environment in a laboratory and presenting different 
types of information to two samples of investors. Still, we believe that our research adds 
knowledge to current literature since it is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, trying 
to test the CSR signaling effect on stock price changes, and may be a good starting point for 
further refinements. Future research may also consider shortening the temporal window of the 
stock price change, e.g. taking into consideration the day of disclosure. Moreover, since 
capital markets have been significantly volatile in recent years, as noted by Jeffers and 
DeGaetano (2013), our final results may have been distorted. Lastly, as pointed out in the 
literature review, the overall impact of CSR disclosure on stock prices is likely to reflect the 
influence of the legal and the institutional environment which the firm is settled in, as well as 
the presence of the halo effect, the past track record of CSR activities and other company-
specific factors. One way to reduce the country-specific factors effect is to use CSR 
performance ratings based on the relative performance of firms to their peers (Ferrell et al., 
2017, forthcoming). 
With reference to Hypothesis 2, as previously noticed, the main shortcoming is the lack of 
examination of the content of CSR reports. The measures we considered do not completely 
capture the level of sustainability disclosure of each company, nor the quality of CSR 
activities. Despite being objective, they can be quite easily manipulated by firms to increase 
the level of transparency. For example, by simply adding pages with images to CSR reports, 
companies can increase their CSR transparency index. A qualitative examination of the 
content of reports would have meant to reduce the number of companies included in the 
sample, but it would have made the results less susceptible to greenwashing, thus stronger. If 
future researchers decide to take this different approach, they will need to balance 
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ID_Obs Company Stock index First CSR disclosure
1 A2A FTSE MIB 2008
2 Atlantia FTSE MIB 2013
3 Azimut FTSE MIB n.a.
4 Banca Mediolanum FTSE MIB 2007
5 Banca Bpm FTSE MIB 2004
6 Bca Mps FTSE MIB n.a.
7 Bper Banca FTSE MIB 2013
8 Brembo FTSE MIB 2017
9 Buzzi Unicem FTSE MIB 2004
10 Campari FTSE MIB 2013
11 Cnh Industrial FTSE MIB n.a.
12 Enel FTSE MIB 1996
13 Eni FTSE MIB 2006
14 Exor FTSE MIB n.a.
15 Ferrari FTSE MIB n.a.
16 FCA FTSE MIB 2005
17 Finecobank FTSE MIB n.a.
18 Generali FTSE MIB 2005
19 Intesa FTSE MIB 2008
20 Italgas FTSE MIB n.a.
21 Leonardo FTSE MIB 2011
22 Luxottica FTSE MIB n.a.
23 Mediaset FTSE MIB n.a.
24 Mediobanca FTSE MIB n.a.
25 Moncler FTSE MIB 2016
26 Poste Italiane FTSE MIB 2001
27 Prysmian FTSE MIB 2012
28 Recordati Ord FTSE MIB n.a.
29 Saipem FTSE MIB 2007
30 Salvatore Ferragamo FTSE MIB 2016
31 Snam FTSE MIB 2007
32 Stmicroelectronics FTSE MIB 1998
33 Telecom Italia FTSE MIB 1998
34 Tenaris FTSE MIB 2010
35 Terna FTSE MIB 2006
36 UBI Banca FTSE MIB 2002
37 Unicredit FTSE MIB 2001
38 Unipol FTSE MIB 1993
39 Unipolsai FTSE MIB 1993
40 Yoox Net-A-Porter Group FTSE MIB 2017
41 Inditex IBEX 35 1998
42 Banco Santander IBEX 35 2002
43 Telefonica IBEX 35 2002
44 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentinta IBEX 35 2006
45 Iberdrola IBEX 35 2012
46 Caixabank IBEX 35 2011
47 Amadeus IT Group IBEX 35 n.a.
48 Repsol YPF IBEX 35 2005
49 Gas Natural Fenosa IBEX 35 2002
50 Abertis Infraestructuras IBEX 35 2003
51 Ferrovial IBEX 35 2014
52 International Consolidated Airlines Group IBEX 35 2011
53 Gamesa corporacion tecnologica IBEX 35 2006
54 ACS actividades de construcción y servicios IBEX 35 2006
55 Mapfre IBEX 35 2004
56 Banco Sabadell IBEX 35 n.a.
57 Bankinter IBEX 35 2005
58 Enagas IBEX 35 n.a.
59 Acciona IBEX 35 2005
ID_Obs Company Stock index First CSR disclosure
60 Mediaset Espana Comunicacion IBEX 35 2005
61 DIA-Distribuidora Internacional de Alimentos IBEX 35 n.a.
62 Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas SA IBEX 35 n.a.
63 Bolsas y Mercados Espanoles IBEX 35 n.a.
64 Viscofan IBEX 35 n.a.
65 Indra Sistemas IBEX 35 2015
66 Tecnicas Reunidas IBEX 35 2012
67 Sacyr SA IBEX 35 2006
68 Obrascon Huarte Lain SA IBEX 35 n.a.
69 Abengoa SA IBEX 35 2002
70 Banco Popular Espanol IBEX 35 n.a.
71 SAP DAX 2008
72 Siemens DAX n.a.
73 Bayer DAX 2013
74 BASF DAX n.a.
75 Allianz DAX 2002
76 Deutsche Telekom DAX 1996
77 Daimler DAX 2010
78 Volkswagen DAX 2011
79 Bayerische Motoren Werke DAX n.a.
80 Henkel DAX 1992
81 Fresenius DAX n.a.
82 Continental DAX 2011
83 Deutsche Post DAX 2006
84 Adidas DAX 2000
85 Linde Group (The) DAX 2005
86 Deutsche Bank DAX 2002
87 Muenchener Rueckversicher DAX 2001
88 Fresenius Medical Care DAX n.a.
89 Beiersdorf DAX 2003
90 Infineon Technologies DAX 2016
91 E.ON DAX 2004
92 Heidelbergcement DAX 2004
93 Vonovia DAX 2015
94 Merck KGAA DAX 2003
95 Thyssenkrupp DAX 2004
96 Commerzbank DAX 2005
97 RWE DAX 1998
98 Deutsche Lufthansa DAX 1994
99 Prosiebensat 1 Media SE DAX 2015
100 Altri SGPS PSI 20 n.a.
101 Banco Comr. Portugues 'R' PSI 20 n.a.
102 Corticeira Amorim PSI 20 2007
103 CCT Correios de Portugal PSI 20 2005
104 EDP Renovaveis PSI 20 2010
105 EDP Energias de Portugal PSI 20 n.a.
106 GALP Energia SGPS PSI 20 2006
107 Ibersol - SGPS PSI 20 2007
108 Jeronimo Martins PSI 20 2011
109 Mota Engil SGPS PSI 20 n.a.
110 NOS SGPS PSI 20 n.a.
111 Novabase PSI 20 n.a.
112 Pharol SGPS PSI 20 n.a.
113 REN PSI 20 2005
114 Semapa PSI 20 n.a.
115 Sonae Capital PSI 20 2001
116 Sonae SGPS PSI 20 2001
117 Navigator Comp PSI 20 2004
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ID_Obs Company year CSR/FIN 1 CSR/FIN 2 CSR index_R FIN index_R
1 A2A 2015 CSR FIN 24.0868         21.3170        
2 A2A 2014 CSR FIN 22.4196         20.9929        
3 A2A 2013 CSR FIN 36.1651         21.3802        
4 Atlantia 2015 CSR FIN 34.5162         39.3955        
5 Atlantia 2014 CSR FIN 35.2237         39.5032        
6 Atlantia 2013 CSR FIN 35.9315         39.3547        
7 Azimut 2015 CSR FIN -                 36.5246        
8 Azimut 2014 CSR FIN -                 36.3971        
9 Azimut 2013 CSR FIN -                 36.4010        
10 Banca Bpm 2015 CSR FIN 34.0972         31.7780        
11 Banca Bpm 2014 CSR FIN 34.5604         25.8720        
12 Banca Bpm 2013 CSR FIN 34.7573         27.4630        
13 Banca Mediolanum 2015 CSR FIN 20.1959         25.9230        
14 Banca Mediolanum 2014 CSR FIN 35.1064         21.4225        
15 Banca Mediolanum 2013 CSR FIN 34.1861         23.3271        
16 Bca Mps 2015 CSR FIN -                 26.5208        
17 Bca Mps 2014 CSR FIN -                 32.2593        
18 Bca Mps 2013 CSR FIN -                 31.3723        
19 Bper Banca 2015 CSR FIN 17.9114         24.5813        
20 Bper Banca 2014 CSR FIN 17.6433         26.2355        
21 Bper Banca 2013 CSR FIN 18.4792         26.3048        
22 Brembo 2015 CSR FIN -                 36.2399        
23 Brembo 2014 CSR FIN -                 21.9383        
24 Brembo 2013 CSR FIN -                 22.9842        
25 Buzzi Unicem 2015 CSR FIN 18.9490         21.1640        
26 Buzzi Unicem 2014 CSR FIN 20.2421         21.2996        
27 Buzzi Unicem 2013 CSR FIN 19.9537         21.3014        
28 Campari 2015 CSR FIN 18.7048         38.1176        
29 Campari 2014 CSR FIN 18.5671         38.3311        
30 Campari 2013 CSR FIN 23.9217         23.4844        
31 Cnh Industrial 2015 CSR FIN 26.3947         39.2276        
32 Cnh Industrial 2014 CSR FIN 24.4618         39.2067        
33 Cnh Industrial 2013 CSR FIN 24.0225         38.9380        
34 Enel 2015 CSR FIN 25.4485         26.6815        
35 Enel 2014 CSR FIN 22.4599         26.7104        
36 Enel 2013 CSR FIN 22.6701         25.5800        
37 Eni 2015 CSR FIN 21.0738         41.4403        
38 Eni 2014 CSR FIN 20.9539         41.3239        
39 Eni 2013 CSR FIN 19.9116         41.8946        
40 Exor 2015 CSR FIN -                 25.1077        
41 Exor 2014 CSR FIN -                 25.5220        
42 Exor 2013 CSR FIN -                 25.3125        
43 FCA 2015 CSR FIN 36.8965         25.4457        
44 FCA 2014 CSR FIN 24.7450         25.8180        
45 FCA 2013 CSR FIN -                 -                 
46 Ferrari 2015 CSR FIN -                 24.5679        
47 Ferrari 2014 CSR FIN -                 -                 
48 Ferrari 2013 CSR FIN -                 -                 
49 Finecobank 2015 CSR FIN -                 -                 
50 Finecobank 2014 CSR FIN -                 23.5789        
51 Finecobank 2013 CSR FIN -                 -                 
52 Generali 2015 CSR FIN 5.8744           38.7905        
53 Generali 2014 CSR FIN 5.4059           38.6721        
54 Generali 2013 CSR FIN 7.6399           24.1015        
55 Intesa 2015 CSR FIN 38.1525         27.9917        
56 Intesa 2014 CSR FIN 37.6413         28.6057        
57 Intesa 2013 CSR FIN 36.1894         28.3913        
58 Italgas 2015 CSR FIN -                 -                 
59 Italgas 2014 CSR FIN -                 -                 
60 Italgas 2013 CSR FIN -                 -                 
ID_Obs Company year CSR/FIN 1 CSR/FIN 2 CSR index_R FIN index_R
61 Leonardo 2015 CSR FIN 20.6996        22.4158        
62 Leonardo 2014 CSR FIN 21.8667        22.5300        
63 Leonardo 2013 CSR FIN 20.8711        22.5308        
64 Luxottica 2015 CSR FIN -                 22.9562        
65 Luxottica 2014 CSR FIN -                 22.6884        
66 Luxottica 2013 CSR FIN -                 22.6014        
67 Mediaset 2015 CSR FIN -                 25.4436        
68 Mediaset 2014 CSR FIN -                 25.4716        
69 Mediaset 2013 CSR FIN -                 24.9822        
70 Mediobanca 2015 CSR FIN -                 28.1690        
71 Mediobanca 2014 CSR FIN -                 26.0769        
72 Mediobanca 2013 CSR FIN -                 25.7511        
73 Moncler 2015 CSR FIN 33.6719        34.8267        
74 Moncler 2014 CSR FIN -                 20.3555        
75 Moncler 2013 CSR FIN -                 23.0143        
76 Poste Italiane 2015 CSR FIN -                 26.7036        
77 Poste Italiane 2014 CSR FIN -                 27.1677        
78 Poste Italiane 2013 CSR FIN -                 26.8150        
79 Prysmian 2015 CSR FIN 34.6384        24.0589        
80 Prysmian 2014 CSR FIN 34.6332        24.5096        
81 Prysmian 2013 CSR FIN 34.6039        24.0604        
82 Recordati Ord 2015 CSR FIN -                 23.3036        
83 Recordati Ord 2014 CSR FIN -                 23.6210        
84 Recordati Ord 2013 CSR FIN -                 23.4906        
85 Saipem 2015 CSR FIN 36.2790        40.4150        
86 Saipem 2014 CSR FIN 35.8742        40.0570        
87 Saipem 2013 CSR FIN 36.9311        40.2820        
88 Salvatore Ferragamo2015 CSR FIN 36.3745        23.5733        
89 Salvatore Ferragamo2014 CSR FIN -                 23.4880        
90 Salvatore Ferragamo2013 CSR FIN -                 22.8483        
91 Snam 2015 CSR FIN 34.0930        24.3135        
92 Snam 2014 CSR FIN 34.7685        24.7843        
93 Snam 2013 CSR FIN 20.4514        23.9732        
94 Stmicroelectronics2015 CSR FIN 21.7494        23.7614        
95 Stmicroelectronics2014 CSR FIN 26.0282        24.7995        
96 Stmicroelectronics2013 CSR FIN 22.4714        24.0854        
97 Telecom Italia 2015 CSR FIN 37.6422        41.5899        
98 Telecom Italia 2014 CSR FIN 36.5231        42.0721        
99 Telecom Italia 2013 CSR FIN 35.0029        41.2883        
100 Tenaris 2015 CSR FIN 4.1470          35.1532        
101 Tenaris 2014 CSR FIN 4.1736          20.8909        
102 Tenaris 2013 CSR FIN -                 35.0369        
103 Terna 2015 CSR FIN 21.6239        24.5773        
104 Terna 2014 CSR FIN 22.0887        26.3108        
105 Terna 2013 CSR FIN 22.0512        25.9089        
106 UBI Banca 2015 CSR FIN 7.5468          28.3479        
107 UBI Banca 2014 CSR FIN 37.7743        28.2134        
108 UBI Banca 2013 CSR FIN 37.1202        28.1020        
109 Unicredit 2015 CSR FIN 40.9989        28.2453        
110 Unicredit 2014 CSR FIN 36.3993        28.3196        
111 Unicredit 2013 CSR FIN 23.1981        27.6707        
112 Unipol 2015 CSR FIN 36.6718        23.1893        
113 Unipol 2014 CSR FIN -                 23.7991        
114 Unipol 2013 CSR FIN 37.0254        23.6808        
115 Unipolsai 2015 CSR FIN -                 22.3092        
116 Unipolsai 2014 CSR FIN 6.0555          23.0516        
117 Unipolsai 2013 CSR FIN -                 -                 
118 Yoox Net-A-Porter Group2015 CSR FIN -                 23.8901        
119 Yoox Net-A-Porter Group2014 CSR FIN -                 -                 
120 Yoox Net-A-Porter Group2013 CSR FIN -                 -                 










ID_Obs Company year CSR/FIN 1 CSR/FIN 2 CSR index_W FIN index_W
61 Leonardo 2015 CSR FIN 28.5714-          -                  
62 Leonardo 2014 CSR FIN 28.5714-          -                  
63 Leonardo 2013 CSR FIN 28.5714-          -                  
64 Luxottica 2015 CSR FIN -                  -                  
65 Luxottica 2014 CSR FIN -                  -                  
66 Luxottica 2013 CSR FIN -                  -                  
67 Mediaset 2015 CSR FIN -                  -                  
68 Mediaset 2014 CSR FIN -                  -                  
69 Mediaset 2013 CSR FIN -                  -                  
70 Mediobanca 2015 CSR FIN -                  -                  
71 Mediobanca 2014 CSR FIN -                  -                  
72 Mediobanca 2013 CSR FIN -                  -                  
73 Moncler 2015 CSR FIN -                  14.2857          
74 Moncler 2014 CSR FIN -                  14.2857          
75 Moncler 2013 CSR FIN -                  14.2857          
76 Poste Italiane 2015 CSR FIN -                  -                  
77 Poste Italiane 2014 CSR FIN -                  -                  
78 Poste Italiane 2013 CSR FIN -                  -                  
79 Prysmian 2015 CSR FIN 42.8571-          28.5714-          
80 Prysmian 2014 CSR FIN 42.8571-          28.5714-          
81 Prysmian 2013 CSR FIN 42.8571-          28.5714-          
82 Recordati Ord 2015 CSR FIN -                  -                  
83 Recordati Ord 2014 CSR FIN -                  -                  
84 Recordati Ord 2013 CSR FIN -                  -                  
85 Saipem 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          28.5714-          
86 Saipem 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          28.5714-          
87 Saipem 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          28.5714-          
88 Salvatore Ferragamo 2015 CSR FIN -                  -                  
89 Salvatore Ferragamo 2014 CSR FIN -                  -                  
90 Salvatore Ferragamo 2013 CSR FIN -                  -                  
91 Snam 2015 CSR FIN -                  14.2857-          
92 Snam 2014 CSR FIN -                  14.2857-          
93 Snam 2013 CSR FIN -                  14.2857-          
94 Stmicroelectronics 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
95 Stmicroelectronics 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
96 Stmicroelectronics 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
97 Telecom Italia 2015 CSR FIN 42.8571-          28.5714-          
98 Telecom Italia 2014 CSR FIN 42.8571-          28.5714-          
99 Telecom Italia 2013 CSR FIN 42.8571-          28.5714-          
100 Tenaris 2015 CSR FIN -                  14.2857          
101 Tenaris 2014 CSR FIN -                  14.2857          
102 Tenaris 2013 CSR FIN -                  14.2857          
103 Terna 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
104 Terna 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
105 Terna 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
106 UBI Banca 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
107 UBI Banca 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
108 UBI Banca 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
109 Unicredit 2015 CSR FIN 28.5714-          14.2857-          
110 Unicredit 2014 CSR FIN 28.5714-          14.2857-          
111 Unicredit 2013 CSR FIN 28.5714-          14.2857-          
112 Unipol 2015 CSR FIN -                  14.2857-          
113 Unipol 2014 CSR FIN -                  14.2857-          
114 Unipol 2013 CSR FIN -                  14.2857-          
115 Unipolsai 2015 CSR FIN -                  -                  
116 Unipolsai 2014 CSR FIN -                  -                  
117 Unipolsai 2013 CSR FIN -                  -                  
118 Yoox Net-A-Porter Group 2015 CSR FIN -                  14.2857-          
119 Yoox Net-A-Porter Group 2014 CSR FIN -                  14.2857-          
120 Yoox Net-A-Porter Group 2013 CSR FIN -                  14.2857-          
ID_Obs Company year CSR/FIN 1 CSR/FIN 2 CSR index_W FIN index_W
1 A2A 2015 CSR FIN 28.5714-          -                  
2 A2A 2014 CSR FIN 28.5714-          -                  
3 A2A 2013 CSR FIN 28.5714-          -                  
4 Atlantia 2015 CSR FIN -                   14.2857-          
5 Atlantia 2014 CSR FIN -                   14.2857-          
6 Atlantia 2013 CSR FIN -                   14.2857-          
7 Azimut 2015 CSR FIN -                   -                  
8 Azimut 2014 CSR FIN -                   -                  
9 Azimut 2013 CSR FIN -                   -                  
10 Banca Bpm 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
11 Banca Bpm 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
12 Banca Bpm 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
13 Banca Mediolanum 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          14.2857          
14 Banca Mediolanum 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          14.2857          
15 Banca Mediolanum 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          14.2857          
16 Bca Mps 2015 CSR FIN -                   14.2857-          
17 Bca Mps 2014 CSR FIN -                   14.2857-          
18 Bca Mps 2013 CSR FIN -                   14.2857-          
19 Bper Banca 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
20 Bper Banca 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
21 Bper Banca 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
22 Brembo 2015 CSR FIN -                   14.2857          
23 Brembo 2014 CSR FIN -                   14.2857          
24 Brembo 2013 CSR FIN -                   14.2857          
25 Buzzi Unicem 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          14.2857-          
26 Buzzi Unicem 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          14.2857-          
27 Buzzi Unicem 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          14.2857-          
28 Campari 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
29 Campari 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
30 Campari 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
31 Cnh Industrial 2015 CSR FIN -                   -                  
32 Cnh Industrial 2014 CSR FIN -                   -                  
33 Cnh Industrial 2013 CSR FIN -                   -                  
34 Enel 2015 CSR FIN -                   28.5714-          
35 Enel 2014 CSR FIN -                   28.5714-          
36 Enel 2013 CSR FIN -                   28.5714-          
37 Eni 2015 CSR FIN 42.8571-          28.5714-          
38 Eni 2014 CSR FIN 42.8571-          28.5714-          
39 Eni 2013 CSR FIN 42.8571-          28.5714-          
40 Exor 2015 CSR FIN -                   -                  
41 Exor 2014 CSR FIN -                   -                  
42 Exor 2013 CSR FIN -                   -                  
43 FCA 2015 CSR FIN 28.5714-          14.2857-          
44 FCA 2014 CSR FIN 28.5714-          14.2857-          
45 FCA 2013 CSR FIN 28.5714-          14.2857-          
46 Ferrari 2015 CSR FIN -                   -                  
47 Ferrari 2014 CSR FIN -                   -                  
48 Ferrari 2013 CSR FIN -                   -                  
49 Finecobank 2015 CSR FIN -                   14.2857-          
50 Finecobank 2014 CSR FIN -                   14.2857-          
51 Finecobank 2013 CSR FIN -                   14.2857-          
52 Generali 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          28.5714-          
53 Generali 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          28.5714-          
54 Generali 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          28.5714-          
55 Intesa 2015 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
56 Intesa 2014 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
57 Intesa 2013 CSR FIN 14.2857-          -                  
58 Italgas 2015 CSR FIN -                   -                  
59 Italgas 2014 CSR FIN -                   -                  
60 Italgas 2013 CSR FIN -                   -                  
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Exhibit 4. Observations flagged as outliers 
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